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Abstract. This paper presents models for predicted click-through rates
in position auctions that take into account two possibilities that are not
normally considered—that the identities of ads shown in other positions
may affect the probability that an ad in a particular position receives a
click (externalities) and that some ads may be less adversely affected by
being shown in a lower position than others (brand effects). We present a
general axiomatic methodology for how click probabilities are affected by
the qualities of the ads in the other positions, and illustrate that using
these axioms will increase revenue as long as higher quality ads tend
to be ranked ahead of lower quality ads. We also present appropriate
algorithms for selecting the optimal allocation of ads when predicted
click-through rates are governed by either the models of externalities or
brand effects that we consider. Finally, we analyze the performance of
a greedy algorithm of ranking the ads by their expected cost-per-1000-
impressions bids when the true click-through rates are governed by our
model of predicted click-through rates with brand effects and illustrate
that such an algorithm will potentially cost as much as half of the total
possible social welfare.
1 Introduction
Sponsored search advertising is big business, with major search engines col-
lectively generating tens of billions of dollars of revenue per year. In spon-
sored search auctions, advertisements appear alongside search results from ma-
jor search engines in a variety of positions on the page, some of which are more
prominent and thus more likely to be clicked than others. In both academic work
and practice, it is standard to model each position as having some quality score
that reflects the relative probability that an ad will receive a click in that position
and then ranking the ads by a product of their bid, the maximum amount the
advertisers will pay per click, and a quality score, which reflects the probability
an ad will receive a click if the advertiser is shown in the top position.
Although it is almost universal to assume that an ad’s click probability is a
product of the quality score of the ad and a quality score of a position, there are
several reasons that this formulation may be suboptimal. First, this formulation
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implicitly assumes that the probability an ad receives a click in a given position
is independent of the identities of the other ads that are shown on the page.
However, this assumption is unlikely to hold in practice. [10] notes empirically
that many consumers are likely to search for what they are looking for by be-
ginning their search at the top of the page and ceasing to search after they have
found what they are looking for, and [31] presents empirical evidence that ads
impose large negative externalities on other ads by virtue of the fact that the
ads can be substitutes for one another. Consequently, placing higher quality ads
at the top of the page decreases the probability that a user clicks on other ads.
Another potential problem with the standard formulation of click probabil-
ities in sponsored search auctions is that this formulation also implies that the
percentage decrease in the probability that any given ad will receive a click as a
result of being placed in a lower position is the same for all ads. But this relation-
ship is also unlikely to hold empirically. For instance, [30] notes that if there are
some consumers who simply gravitate towards the highest-quality company re-
gardless of where that company’s ads are on the page, whereas other consumers
simply gravitate towards the top of the page first, then ads from well-known
companies will be less adversely affected by being shown in a lower position on
the page. [30] also provides empirical support for this.
How then, might one incorporate these possibilities into sponsored search
auctions to choose a more efficient allocation of ads? This paper presents methods
for achieving this goal. We begin by presenting a general axiomatic model of
predicted click-through rates when the probability an ad receives a click may
depend not only on the quality score of the ad and the position in question, but
also on the quality scores of the other ads that are shown in the other positions.
We analyze the properties of this axiomatic formulation, and illustrate that as
long as higher quality ads are typically ranked ahead of lower ads, then moving
towards this new axiomatic model will increase revenue in expectation.
A drawback of the most general possible formulation is that computing the
optimal allocation of ads is unlikely to be computationally feasible because one
cannot simply rank the ads by a product of their bid and their quality score.
Instead, one would likely need to try each possible configuration of ads in order to
choose the optimal configuration, and this is likely to be too slow to be useful in
practice. For this reason, we also develop a second formulation that is a special
case of our most general methodology that has the advantage of admitting a
rapidly converging algorithm for computing the optimal allocation of ads.
In addition to presenting methodology to explicitly consider the externalities
imposed by one ad on another ad, we also present methodology for capturing the
fact that ads from well-known high-quality brands are likely to be less adversely
affected by being shown on lower positions on the page than non-brand ads.
In the formulation we present, it is easy to rule out certain configurations of
ads as suboptimal, and simply trying each of the non-dominated configurations
is likely to enable one to find the optimal allocation of ads sufficiently quickly
to be useful in practice. However, the purely greedy strategy of ranking the
ads by their expected cost-per-1000-impressions (eCPM) bids will still not work
in this formulation, and may, in fact, lead to lower economic welfare than not
considering these brand effects at all.
While a few papers have presented theoretical analyses of circumstances
where the click-through rates are not equal to a product of the quality score
of an ad and the quality score of a position ([3], [6], [19], [30], and [34]), the vast
majority of papers on position auctions only consider situations in which click
probabilities can be expressed in this manner (e.g. [1], [2], [5], [7], [8], [9], [11],
[12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [22], [24], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40], [41], [42],
[43], [44], and [45]). Furthermore, [4] and [23] have noted that this separability
property can be quite important for obtaining desirable properties such as the
ability to choose the efficient allocation by greedily ranking of the ads.
In addition, the few papers that explicitly consider non-separable click-through
rates differ significantly from our paper. [3] and [34] consider models in which
users search from the top of the page to the bottom that leads to non-separable
click probabilities and tractable algorithms for choosing the optimal allocation
of ads, but do not consider more general models of click probabilities, as we
do in the present paper. [20], [21], and [41] further analyze the equilibrium and
efficiency properties of such a model, and [21] also empirically estimates the
parameters in such a model using data from Microsoft Live, but [31] finds em-
pirical evidence that models in which users search from the top of the page to
the bottom do not fully match the data.
Other papers consider different models of externalities, but these still differ
from our work in significant ways. [6] and [30] both consider alternative models of
user behavior that result in non-separable click probabilities, but do not present
algorithms for choosing the optimal allocation of ads. [18] and [19] address ques-
tions related to the computational hardness of the winner-determination prob-
lem in separate models of position auctions with externalities with alternative
assumptions, but do not present axiomatic methodology for new models of pre-
dicted click-through rates or tractable methods for computing the optimal al-
location of ads in such models. Lastly, [25] presents a model of advertising in
a stream in which ads can only be placed in between certain news items that
provide a reasonable context for the ad, but does not address the question of
externalities that we consider in this paper.
Finally, our paper also relates to general economics literature on auctions
with allocative externalities such as [26], [27], [28], [29], [32], and [33]. This liter-
ature has considered, amongst other issues, the possibility that a player’s payoff
might be affected by which of the other bidders wins the auction in addition to
whether the player wins the auction. However, this work has not been applied
to Internet position auctions, which is our focus in the present paper.
2 Model of Externalities
There is an auction for s advertising positions on a page. Each advertising po-
sition k has a quality score nk, where we assume without loss of generality that
nk is non-increasing in k. There are also m advertisers. Each advertiser i has a
quality score qi reflecting the relative clickability of the ad and makes a bid bi
reflecting the maximum amount that this advertiser will pay per click.
In this setting, a standard model of position auctions such as [12] or [43] would
assume that the probability advertiser i receives a click in position k is nkqi. We
relax this assumption by allowing the probability an advertiser receives a click
to depend on these quality scores in a more nuanced way. To do this, we first
identify axioms that we believe should be satisfied by a reasonable model of click
probabilities. We let p(j) = fj(q(1), . . . , q(s);n1, . . . , ns) denote the probability
that the advertiser in the jth position receives a click as a function of the quality
scores of the ads in the first s positions as well as quality scores of the s positions.
We stipulate that this probability should satisfy these axioms:
(A1) The probability an ad receives a click is 0 if either the ad’s quality score
is 0 or the ad’s position has a quality score of 0. That is, fj(q(1), . . . , q(s);n1, . . . , ns) =
0 if either q(j) = 0 or nj = 0.
(A2) The probability an ad receives a click is increasing in the ad’s quality
score. That is, we require that fj(q(1), . . . , q(s);n1, . . . , ns) is increasing in q(j)
for all j satisfying nj > 0.
(A3) The probability an ad in a particular position receives a click is increas-
ing in the quality score of that position. That is, we require that fj(q(1), . . . , q(s);n1, . . . , ns)
is increasing in nj for all j satisfying q(j) > 0.
(A4) The probability an ad in a particular position receives a click is non-
increasing in the quality scores of ads in other positions. That is, fj(q(1), . . . , q(s);n1, . . . , ns)
is non-increasing in q(k) for all k 6= j.
(A5) Increasing the quality score of an ad in a higher quality position de-
creases the click-through rates of ads in other positions by more than increas-
ing the quality score of an ad in a lower quality position. Formally, let q ≡
(q(1), . . . , q(s)) denote a vector of qualities for which q(i) = q(k) = q
∗ for some
particular i and k satisfying ni > nk. Also let q(i) denote the vector of qualities
that would result from replacing q(i) = q
∗ with q(i) = qˆ for some qˆ 6= q
∗, and
let q(k) denote the vector of qualities that would result from replacing q(k) = q
∗
with q(k) = qˆ for the same qˆ. Then |fj(q(i);n1, . . . , ns) − fj(q;n1, . . . , ns)| ≥
|fj(q(k);n1, . . . , ns)− fj(q;n1, . . . , ns)| for all j /∈ {i, k}.
While properties (A1)-(A3) are intuitive properties that are satisfied by stan-
dard models of click-through rates such as [12] and [43], axioms (A4) and (A5)
are less standard. Both of these axioms capture the possibility that an ad may
impose a negative externality that affects whether other ads receive a click.
In particular, axiom (A4) simply reflects the possibility that when a higher
quality ad assumes a particular position, the ad is likely to decrease the proba-
bility that ads in other positions receive a click. This axiom is plausible because
if the quality of an ad in a particular position increases, users are relatively more
likely to click on this ad, which in turn draws their attention from other ads and
decreases the likelihood that users will click on other ads.
Similarly, axiom (A5) reflects the fact that increasing the quality of an ad in
a higher quality position does more to decrease the click-through rates of ads in
other positions than increasing the quality of an ad in a lower quality position.
Increasing the quality of an ad in a higher quality position does more to increase
the probability that users will click on that ad, so increasing the quality of an ad
in a higher quality position also draws more user attention from other ads than
increasing the quality of an ad in a lower quality position. Thus both axioms
(A4) and (A5) reflect sensible properties on how changing the qualities of ads in
other positions is likely to affect the probabilities that other ads receive a click.
Throughout our analysis of models of position auctions, we focus on mech-
anisms in which the auctioneer chooses the allocation of ads that would max-
imize total expected welfare with respect to the bids of the advertisers. That
is, the auctioneer chooses the allocation of ads that results in the highest value
of
∑s
j=1 b(j)p(j), where b(j) denotes the cost per click bid of the advertiser in
the jth position and p(j) denotes the probability that the advertiser in the j
th
position receives a click.
In setting prices we focus on a generalization of the generalized second price
auction in which the advertiser in the jth position is charged a cost per click
c(j) that represents the smallest bid that this advertiser could make while still
maintaining the jth position when the allocation of ads is chosen using the above
algorithm. In the special case in which fj(q(1), . . . , q(s);n1, . . . , ns) = njq(j) for
all j, as in [12] and [43], this pricing algorithm would indeed result in the same
prices selected by the standard generalized second price auction.
3 General Results
We first derive some general results on how using an alternative model of pre-
dicted click-through rates meeting the axioms given in the previous section would
affect revenue from online auctions. To do this, we compare two otherwise iden-
tical methods for predicting the click-through rates of ads in position auctions.
The first method is one in which the predicted click-through rates of the ads in
slots j /∈ {k, k + 1} are independent of the quality scores of the ads in positions
k and k + 1, as in a standard model. The other method we consider is one in
which the predicted click-through rates of the ads in positions j /∈ {k, k + 1}
may depend on the quality scores of the ads in positions k and k+1 in a manner
that satisfies the axioms (A4) and (A5) presented in the previous section.
There are two different ways that incorporating the possibility that the qual-
ity scores of ads may affect the click-through rates of ads in other positions
could affect revenue. First there is the possibility that this could affect the al-
location of ads that is shown in the auction. In this case, if the revised model
of predicted click-through rates is more accurate, then one would choose a more
efficient allocation of ads, and thereby typically achieve higher revenue.
However, in a substantial percentage of auctions, allowing for the possibility
that an ad’s predicted click-through rate may depend on the quality scores of
the other ads will not change the allocation of ads but will affect the pricing.
It is thus important to assess how the prices that the advertisers pay would be
affected by the changed model of predicted click-through rates even if this does
not affect the allocation of ads. This is addressed in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. Consider two different models of predicted click-through rates for
position auctions that are identical except for the following:
(1) For the first model, the predicted click-through rates of ads in slots j /∈
{k, k + 1} are independent of the quality scores of the ads in slots k and k + 1.
(2) For the second model, the predicted click-through rates of ads in slots
j /∈ {k, k + 1} depend on the quality scores of the ads in slots k and k + 1 in a
manner that satisfies axioms (A4) and (A5).
Then if the allocation of ads that is selected by the two models of predicted
click-through rates is identical, the advertiser in position k pays more per click
under the second model if and only if q(k) > q(k+1).
All omitted proofs are in the appendix. Theorem 1 indicates that if we take
into account the externalities that the ads in positions k and k+1 impose on the
other ads, then the advertiser in position k will pay more per click if and only
if this advertiser has a higher quality ad. Since Theorem 1 applies to all slots
k, repeatedly applying Theorem 1 to every slot suggests that if a model with
externalities has no effect on the allocation of ads, then this model will typically
increase the cost per click paid by an advertiser if and only if this advertiser’s
quality score exceeds that of the advertiser just below him.
The results of this section suggest that if one can more accurately describe
click probabilities by using a model of the form in Section 2, then one should be
able to increase revenue. Typically higher quality ads will be ranked higher than
lower quality ads, so the result in Theorem 1 suggests that even if this model
does not change the allocation of ads, revenue should still increase. And if one
is able to choose a more efficient allocation, then one would also expect revenue
to increase. Thus revenue is likely to increase from using predicted click-through
rates of the form in Section 2 as long as such a model is more accurate.
4 Practical Formulation
For general models of the form in Section 2, it may be difficult to select the
efficiency-maximizing configuration because there are an exponentially large
number of feasible configurations and it is not obvious how one can rule out
different configurations as dominated by others. Thus it is important to use a
model where one can select the efficiency-maximizing configuration in a compu-
tationally tractable way. In this section we present a specific formulation of the
model in Section 2 that permits such a practical implementation.
In particular, in this section we consider a model in which the predicted
click-through rates for the ads in position i are of the form
pi =
νniqi
1 + λ
∑s
j=1 njqj
where λ and ν are positive constants, ni denotes the quality score of the i
th
position, and qi denotes the quality score of the ad in the i
th position. This
formulation is sensible because one would expect the percentage decrease in an
ad’s click-through rate due to the negative externalities imposed by the other
ads to be proportional to the total click-through rates of these ads, meaning
an ad’s click-through rate is likely to be decreased by a factor proportional to
1 + λ
∑s
j=1 njqj . Also note that in this formulation, setting λ = 0 and ν =
1 would recover the standard formulation of predicted click-through rates, so
optimally choosing these parameters can never result in less accurate predicted
click-through rates than the standard formulation. Further note that changing
the value of ν would never change the optimal allocation of ads. Here ν is a term
that only serves to make the predicted click-through rates unbiased on average.
Now define S to be the expected social welfare from a given ranking of ads
when ν = 1. That is define S to be what is given by the following formulation:
S =
∑s
i=1 nibiqi
1 + λ
∑s
j=1 njqj
(1)
where bi denotes the bid of the advertiser in the i
th position. We first begin our
analysis of this formulation by noting when using a non-zero value of λ would
result in changing the allocation of ads:
Theorem 2. Welfare is enhanced by switching the order of the ads in positions
k and m where k < m if and only if bmqm − λqmS > bkqk − λqkS.
Proof. Let Sk,m denote the expected social welfare that would arise from switch-
ing the order of the ads in positions k and m. Note that
Sk,m =
∑s
i=1 nibiqi + (nk − nm)(bmqm − bkqk)
1 + λ
∑s
j=1 njqj + λ(nk − nm)(qm − qk)
From this it follows that Sk,m > S, where S is the social welfare that would
arise from the original ordering of the ads, if and only if
( s∑
i=1
nibiqi + (nk − nm)(bmqm − bkqk)
)(
1 + λ
s∑
j=1
njqj
)
>
( s∑
i=1
nibiqi
)(
1 + λ
s∑
j=1
njqj + λ(nk − nm)(qm − qk)
)
which in turn holds if and only if
(nk − nm)(bmqm − bkqk)
(
1 + λ
s∑
j=1
njqj
)
>
( s∑
i=1
nibiqi
)
λ(nk − nm)(qm − qk).
Now since k < m, we have nk − nm > 0, and the above inequality holds if and
only if
(bmqm − bkqk)
(
1 + λ
s∑
j=1
njqj
)
>
( s∑
i=1
nibiqi
)
λ(qm − qk)
which in turn holds if and only if bmqm − bkqk > Sλ(qm − qk). Thus welfare is
enhanced by switching the order of the ads in positions k and m where k < m
if and only if bmqm − λqmS > bkqk − λqkS. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2 suggests that if one can obtain a good estimate of the social
welfare S that will result in the efficiency-maximizing configuration, then it may
be feasible to rank the ads on the basis of scores of the form bmqm − λqmS
to achieve the efficiency maximizing allocation. We now exploit this insight to
derive a computationally efficient way of selecting the optimal ordering of ads.
The algorithm proceeds by selecting a value SL that is lower than the social
welfare S that will result in the efficiency-maximizing configuration and another
value SH that is higher than the social welfare S that will result in the efficiency-
maximizing configuration. The algorithm then repeatedly replaces either SL or
SH with Sˆ ≡
1
2 (SL + SH) until it finds some such value of Sˆ that is guaranteed
to result in the efficiency-maximizing allocation when ranking ads on the basis
of scores of the form bmqm−λqmS when S = Sˆ. Such an algorithm will typically
require very few steps in practice because after n passes, we know that Sˆ will be
within a factor of 2−n of the true social welfare S corresponding to the efficiency-
maximizing configuration. The detailed steps for the algorithm are as follows:
(1) Define SL to be the expected social welfare calculated in equation (1)
that would result if the ads were ranked on the basis of the scores bmqm.
(2) Define SH ≡
∑s
m=1 nmbmqm when the ads are ranked on the basis of the
scores bmqm.
(3) Calculate the rankings of the ads when the ads are ranked on the basis
of the scores bmqm − λqmS for S = SL and S = SH .
(4) If the rankings of the ads in step (3) are the same for both S = SL and
S = SH , then choose this ranking of the ads.
(5) If these rankings are different, let Sˆ ≡ 12 (SL + SH) and calculate the
ranking of the ads when the ads are ranked on the basis of the scores bmqm −
λqmSˆ.
(6) Let φ(Sˆ) ≡
∑s
m=1 nm(bmqm − λqmSˆ) when the ads are ranked on the
basis of the scores bmqm − λqmSˆ. If φ(Sˆ) < Sˆ, then let SH = Sˆ. Otherwise let
SL = Sˆ.
(7) Repeat steps (3)-(6) until the rankings in step (4) are the same for both
S = SL and S = SH , and choose the resulting ranking of ads.
This algorithm indeed results in the efficiency-maximizing allocation:
Theorem 3. The ranking of ads that results from the algorithm considered above
is the efficiency-maximization allocation.
Proof. Define φ(S) to be equal to the value of
∑s
m=1 nm(bmqm − λqmS) that
would result when the ads are ranked on the basis of the scores bmqm − λqmS.
Note that if S is the social welfare calculated in equation (1) for the efficiency-
maximizing allocation, then φ(S) = S because φ(S) =
∑s
m=1 nm(bmqm−λqmS) =
(
∑s
m=1 nmbmqm)(1 − λ
∑
s
m=1
nmqm
1+λ
∑
s
j=1
njqj
) = (
∑s
m=1 nmbmqm)(
1
1+λ
∑
s
j=1
njqj
) = S.
Also note that φ(S) is decreasing in S, so if S∗ is the social welfare calculated
in equation (1) for the efficiency-maximizing allocation, then φ(S) < S when
S > S∗ and φ(S) > S when S < S∗.
Now note that the value of SL computed in step (1) of the above algorithm is
necessarily no greater than the social welfare that would result in the efficiency-
maximizing allocation because this is the social welfare resulting from some
feasible allocation of ads. Also note that the value of SH computed in step (2)
of the above algorithm is necessarily greater than the social welfare that would
result in the efficiency-maximizing allocation because the value of
∑
s
i=1
nibiqi
1+λ
∑
s
j=1
njqj
is bounded above by
∑s
i=1 nibiqi, which is in turn bounded above by the value
of SH in step (2). From this it follows that if S
∗ is the social welfare calculated
in equation (1) for the efficiency-maximizing allocation, then SL ≤ S
∗ < SH .
Now if the rankings of the ads that are calculated in step (3) of the above
algorithm are the same for both S = SL and S = SH , then the ranking of
the ads that would result from ranking the ads on the basis of scores of the
form bmqm − λqmS when S = S
∗ is the same as the rankings of the ads that
result when ranking the ads on the basis of such scores with either S = SL or
S = SH . But the ranking that results from ranking the ads on the basis of scores
of the form bmqm − λqmS
∗ is the efficiency maximizing allocation, so from this
it follows that if the rankings of the ads that are calculated in step (3) of the
above algorithm are the same for both S = SL and S = SH , then choosing this
ranking indeed results in the efficiency-maximizing allocation.
If these rankings are different, then we know that φ(SL) ≥ SL and φ(SH) <
SH since SL ≤ S
∗ < SH and if S
∗ is the social welfare calculated in equation
(1) for the efficiency-maximizing allocation, then φ(S) < S when S > S∗ and
φ(S) > S when S < S∗. Furthermore, after steps (5) and (6) are executed, it will
be the case that φ(SL) ≥ SL and φ(SH) < SH . From this it follows that after
steps (5) and (6) are executed, it will still be the case that SL ≤ S
∗ < SH when
S∗ is the social welfare in equation (1) for the efficiency-maximizing allocation.
But this means that if the rankings of the ads calculated in step (3) of the
above algorithm after executing steps (5) and (6) are the same for both S = SL
and S = SH , then this ranking would result in the efficiency-maximizing alloca-
tion by the same reasoning as in the third paragraph of this proof. Furthermore,
if these rankings are not the same, then repeating the process in steps (3)-(6)
will ultimately result in values of SL and SH for which these rankings are the
same because the values of SL and SH will eventually get arbitrarily close to
one another. From this it follows that the ranking of ads that results from the
algorithm considered above is the efficiency-maximization allocation. ⊓⊔
Having presented results for a model of position auctions with externalities,
we now turn attention to an alternative model in which there are no externalities
but an ad’s click probability still cannot be expressed as the product of a quality
score of a position and a quality score of an advertiser. In particular, we consider
a model in which the click-through rates of some advertisers are more sensitive
to the precise position in which they are displayed than the click-through rates
of other advertisers. This possibility has been demonstrated to hold empirically,
as [30] has noted that the click-through rates of brand ads are less adversely
affected by being displayed in low positions than those of non-brand ads.
5 Model of Brand Effects
There is an auction for s advertising positions involving m advertisers. Some
advertisers are brand advertisers and other advertisers are non-brand advertisers.
Each advertiser i has a quality score qi reflecting the relative click-through rate
of the ad if the ad is in the top position. Each advertiser i also makes a bid bi
reflecting the maximum amount that this advertiser will pay per click.
How an advertiser’s probability of receiving a click varies with the advertiser’s
position on the page depends on whether the advertiser is a brand advertiser
or a non-brand advertiser. Each advertising position k has two separate quality
scores βk and ηk, where we assume that both βk and ηk are non-increasing in
k. If a brand (non-brand) advertiser with quality score q is shown in position k,
then the advertiser’s click probability is βkq (ηkq). We normalize the values of
βk and ηk by assuming without loss of generality that β1 = η1 = 1.
Our model of position auctions with brand effects allows for the possibility
that some advertisers may be less adversely affected by having their ads shown
in lower positions than other advertisers. In particular, if βk does not decline
as rapidly with k as ηk, then brand advertisers would be less adversely affected
by being displayed in a lower position than non-brand advertisers, as is the case
empirically [30]. This model also encompasses the standard model of position
auctions considered in [12] and [43] as a special case in which βk = ηk for all k.
As in our analysis of models of position auctions with externalities, we focus
on mechanisms in which the auctioneer seeks to maximize total expected welfare
with respect to the bids of the advertisers. That is, the auctioneer chooses the
allocation of ads that maximizes
∑s
j=1 b(j)p(j), where b(j) denotes the bid of the
advertiser in the jth position and p(j) denotes the probability that the ad in the
jth position is clicked.
6 Optimal Allocation
We begin our analysis by noting some simple properties about the optimal allo-
cation of ads with brand effects. While it is difficult to give a full characterization
of the ordering of all the ads, we can present a partial ordering of the positions
the ads will assume by noting how one should order the brand ads amongst each
other as well as the non-brand ads amongst each other:
Observation 1 Let B denote the set of positions in which brand ads are dis-
played and let N denote the set of positions in which non-brand ads are displayed.
Then the optimal allocation of ads involves showing the brand ad with the highest
eCPM in the highest position in B, showing the brand ad with the second-highest
eCPM in the second-highest position in B, and in general showing the brand ad
with the kth-highest eCPM in the kth-highest position in B. Similarly, the opti-
mal allocation of ads involves showing the non-brand ad with the highest eCPM
in the highest position in N , showing the non-brand ad with the second-highest
eCPM in the second-highest position in N , and in general showing the non-brand
ad with the kth-highest eCPM in the kth-highest position in N .
A consequence of this result is that, given a decision about which positions to
show brand ads and non-brand ads in, the optimal allocation for this selection is
uniquely determined by ordering the brand ads by their eCPM bids and doing the
same for the non-brand ads. Thus in order to determine the optimal allocation
of ads in the model in Section 5, it is only necessary to check each possible
configuration of positions in which one can show brand ads, as there is only one
possible allocation that may be optimal given this configuration. Since there are
typically only a small number of slots in most position auctions, checking each
of these possibilities is something that is quite computationally feasible.
Given the above result, the only interesting question is which positions the
auctioneer should show a brand ad in. While a full characterization of this precise
allocation is intractable, we can present such a characterization for some special
cases. We first show that if the brand ads are not adversely affected by being
shown in the lower positions, then the optimal allocation will involve showing
non-brand ads in the top positions and brand ads in the lower positions:
Theorem 4. If βk is independent of k for all k, but ηk is strictly decreasing in
k, then the optimal allocation involves not showing any non-brand ads in a lower
position than a brand ad.
While Theorem 4 presents a precise description of the nature of the optimal
allocation ads in an important special case of this model, it is also important
to ask how one would choose the allocation of ads in more general cases. Al-
though we do not present a full characterization of the optimal allocation of
ads for general values of the separate quality scores for the positions, we can
present the following partial characterization of the circumstances under which
the auctioneer will want to show a brand ad in the next position.
Theorem 5. For a fixed allocation of ads in the first k positions, a fixed set of
eCPM bids for the remaining non-brand advertisers, and a fixed set of eCPM
bids for all the remaining brand advertisers except for the brand advertiser with
the highest eCPM bid amongst the remaining brand advertisers, either it is never
optimal to show a brand ad in the k+1th position, always optimal, or it is optimal
to show a brand ad in the k+ 1th position if and only if this advertiser’s eCPM
bid exceeds some threshold.
Proof. Let vb denote the eCPM bid of the highest remaining brand advertiser,
let vn denote the eCPM bid of the highest remaining non-brand advertiser, let
VB denote the maximum total expected welfare that could be obtained from
the advertisers in positions k + 2 to s if the auctioneer displays a brand ad in
position k + 1, and let VN (vb) denote the maximum total expected welfare that
could be obtained from the advertisers in positions k + 2 to s if the auctioneer
displays a non-brand ad in position k + 1 for any given vb. Note that if v
′ > v,
then VN (v
′)−VN (v) ≤ βk+2(v
′ − v) since increasing the eCPM bid of an eCPM
bidder who will not be displayed before the k+2nd position cannot increase the
total expected welfare arising from positions k+2 to s by more than βk+2 times
the size of this increase.
Now if b(j) denotes the cost per click bid of the advertiser in the j
th position
and p(j) denotes the probability that the advertiser in the j
th position receives a
click, then total expected welfare if the auctioneer displays a brand ad in position
k+1 is
∑k
j=1 b(j)p(j)+ βk+1vb+VB and total expected welfare if the auctioneer
displays a non-brand ad in position k + 1 is
∑k
j=1 b(j)p(j) + ηk+1vn + VN (vb).
From this it follows that the auctioneer should display a brand ad in position
k+1 if and only if
∑k
j=1 b(j)p(j)+βk+1vb+VB ≥
∑k
j=1 b(j)p(j)+ηk+1vn+VN (vb),
which holds if and only if βk+1vb − VN (vb) ≥ ηk+1vn − VB.
But since v′ > v implies that VN (v
′)−VN (v) ≤ βk+2(v
′−v) and βk+1 ≥ βk+2,
it follows that βk+1vb−VN (vb) is non-decreasing in vb. From this it follows that
either βk+1vb − VN (vb) ≥ ηk+1vn − VB never holds for all vb, always holds for
all vb, or holds if and only if vb is greater than or equal to some threshold. Thus
either it is never optimal to show a brand ad in the k + 1th position, always
optimal, or it is optimal to show a brand ad in the k + 1th position if and only
if this advertiser’s eCPM bid exceeds some threshold. ⊓⊔
It is worth noting that while it will be optimal to show a brand ad in the next-
highest position if and only if the eCPM of the brand ad exceeds some threshold,
in general this threshold need not be equal to the highest eCPM of the remaining
non-brand ads. We analyze the consequences of this greedy approach to choosing
the allocation of ads in the next section.
7 Greedy Allocation
In the standard model of position auctions without brand effects, one simply
ranks the ads in order of their estimated eCPMs by showing the ad with the
highest eCPM in the highest position, the ad with the second-highest eCPM in
the second position, and in general showing the ad with the kth-highest eCPM
in the kth position. A natural analog of this approach for the model with brand
effects would be to show the ad with highest normalized eCPM in the first posi-
tion, show the ad with the highest normalized eCPM amongst all remaining ads
in the second position, and in general show the ad with the highest normalized
eCPM amongst all ads not in the first k− 1 positions in the kth position, where
the normalized eCPM for advertiser i in the kth position is equal to βkbiqi if the
ad is a brand ad and ηkbiqi if the ad is a non-brand ad.
While the greedy strategy is suitable in a standard position auction frame-
work without brand effects, when there are brand effects, such a strategy may
only result in a fraction of the maximum possible efficiency that could be achieved:
Theorem 6. Suppose the auctioneer uses the greedy strategy to choose the effi-
cient allocation. Such an algorithm is guaranteed to achieve at least half of the
maximum possible total expected welfare. Moreover, this bound is tight.
Proof. Note that if the greedy strategy fails to select the efficient allocation, then
there must exist some position j for which the greedy strategy elects to display
an ad that would not be the best ad to display in that position in the optimal
allocation. Thus in the optimal allocation, it must be best to instead display
an ad with a lower normalized eCPM in position j and display the ad that the
greedy strategy would display in position j in some other position k > j.
But this means that the normalized eCPM of the ad that is displayed by the
greedy strategy in position j is necessarily greater than the normalized eCPM
of both the ad that the optimal allocation would display in position j as well
as the normalized eCPM of the ad that the optimal allocation would display in
position k. Thus the sum of the normalized eCPMs of the ads that are displayed
in positions j and k by the greedy strategy is necessarily at least half as large
as the sum of the normalized eCPMs of the ads that are displayed in positions
j and k in the optimal allocation.
Since the above result holds for any position j where the greedy strategy
displays a different ad than the ad would be best to display in that position
under the optimal allocation, it then follows that the greedy strategy can never
result in the loss of more than half of the maximum possible total expected
welfare that can be achieved. This proves the first part of the theorem.
To see that the lower bound is tight, suppose there are s = 2 positions, one
brand advertiser with eCPM bid biqi = 1+ ǫ for some small ǫ > 0, and one non-
brand advertiser with eCPM bid biqi = 1. Also suppose that β2 = β1 = η1 = 1
and η2 = 0. In this case, the purely greedy strategy will display the brand ad
in the first position and the non-brand ad in the second position, resulting in
a total expected welfare of 1 + ǫ. However, the optimal strategy will display
the non-brand ad in the first position and the brand ad in the second position,
resulting in a total expected welfare of 2 + ǫ. Since limǫ→0
1+ǫ
2+ǫ =
1
2 , it follows
that one cannot improve on the bounds given in the previous paragraph. Thus
the bound given in the statement of the theorem is tight. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6 indicates that using the greedy strategy to choose the allocation
of ads can result in significant efficiency losses. The reason for this is that the
greedy strategy will sometimes show a brand ad that is only marginally better
than a non-brand ad in a higher position even though that brand ad would
be significantly better than the non-brand ad in the lower position. In these
situations, following the greedy strategy will result in a significantly less efficient
allocation than showing the brand ad in the lower position.
While the greedy strategy may fail to obtain a significant percentage of the
possible efficiency gains that could be achieved, one might conjecture that this
strategy would still result in higher economic welfare than not taking brand
effects into account at all. However, even using an auction framework without
brand effects can still outperform the greedy strategy when there are brand
effects, as the following theorem illustrates:
Theorem 7. The greedy strategy can result in lower expected welfare than se-
lecting the allocation that would be selected by the standard model of predicted
click-through rates without brand effects.
Proof. Suppose there are s = 3 positions, there is one brand advertiser with an
eCPM bid of biqi = 10, a second brand advertiser with an eCPM bid of biqi = 1,
and a non-brand advertiser with an eCPM bid of biqi = 1 + ǫ for some small
ǫ > 0. Also suppose that β3 = β2 = β1 = η1 = 1, η2 =
1
2 , and η3 = 0.
Now if the allocation is selected using the standard model of predicted click-
through rates without brand effects, then the non-brand advertiser will be ranked
ahead of the second brand advertiser, and total expected welfare will be β110+
η2(1+ ǫ)+β31 = 11
1
2 +
ǫ
2 . But if the allocation is selected by the greedy strategy
using the model with brand effects, then the second brand advertiser will be
ranked ahead of the non-brand advertiser, and total expected welfare will be
β110 + β21 + η3(1 + ǫ) = 11 < 11
1
2 +
ǫ
2 . Thus the greedy strategy can result in
lower expected welfare than selecting the allocation that would be selected by
the standard model of predicted click-through rates without brand effects. ⊓⊔
The results in this section indicate that the greedy strategy is a poor choice
for choosing the allocation of ads in a model of brand effects since it will fre-
quently lead to significant efficiency losses. Fortunately, we know from the previ-
ous section that there is a simple algorithm for choosing the optimal allocation
of ads with brand effects, so following this greedy strategy is unnecessary.
8 Conclusions
This paper has presented analysis of alternative models of predicted click-through
rates in position auctions that would model both the externalities that ads in
some positions impose on ads in other positions as well as the possibility that
certain ads would be less adversely affected by being displayed in lower posi-
tions than others. We have presented general axioms that such models might
satisfy, analyzed the revenue consequences of using these schemes, and consid-
ered various algorithms for implementing the selection of ads when the predicted
click-through rates are governed by the relationships we have described.
A natural extension of our analysis would be to analyze how bidders’ equilib-
rium strategies would be affected if the true click-through rates were governed
by the alternative models of predicted click-through rates in this paper and one
moved from using a standard model of predicted click-through rates to using
the correct model. Such analysis would be quite complicated because it would
require one to understand both the nature of the inaccurate quality scores that
are used when fitting the standard model of predicted click-through rates and
then understanding how advertisers would react to a system that uses this in-
accurate model of predicted click-through rates given the true model. Further
analysis could reveal how these changes would affect equilibrium strategies.
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Appendix - Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1: Note that in the second model the predicted click-
through rates of the ads in slots j /∈ {k, k + 1} will be higher if the allocation
of the ads in positions k and k + 1 is reversed if and only if q(k) > q(k+1). To
see this, let q ≡ min{q(k), q(k+1)} and let q ≡ max{q(k), q(k+1)}. We know from
axiom (A4) that if fj(q(k), q(k+1)) denotes the click-through rate of the ad in
position j /∈ {k, k + 1} for given quality scores of the ads in positions k and
k+1 that fj(q, q) < fj(q, q) and fj(q, q) < fj(q, q). Furthermore, we know from
axiom (A5) that |fj(q, q) − fj(q, q)| > |fj(q, q) − fj(q, q)|. By combining these
facts we see that fj(q, q) < fj(q, q) for all j /∈ {k, k + 1}. Thus in the second
model the predicted click-through rates of the ads in slots j /∈ {k, k+ 1} will be
higher if the allocation of the ads in positions k and k+1 is reversed if and only
if q(k) > q(k+1).
Now let S(q(k), q(k+1)) denote the total social welfare that the ads not in
positions k and k + 1 would receive for given quality scores of the ads in posi-
tions k and k+1 (i.e. let S(q(k), q(k+1)) ≡
∑
j /∈{k,k+1} b(j)p(j)(q(k), q(k+1)) where
p(j)(q(k), q(k+1)) denotes the predicted click-through rate of an ad in position
j for given quality scores of the ads in positions k and k + 1). Then total so-
cial welfare that arises for given quality scores of the ads in positions k and
k+ 1 is b(k)p(k)(q(k), q(k+1)) + b(k+1)p(k+1)(q(k), q(k+1)) + S(q(k), q(k+1)). Thus if
the order of the ads in positions k and k + 1 is reversed, then total social wel-
fare will be b(k+1)p(k)(q(k+1), q(k))+b(k)p(k+1)(q(k+1), q(k))+S(q(k+1), q(k)). From
this it follows that the advertiser in position k pays a cost per click c satisfying
cp(k)(q(k), q(k+1))+b(k+1)p(k+1)(q(k), q(k+1))+S(q(k), q(k+1)) = b(k+1)p(k)(q(k+1), q(k))+
b(k)p(k+1)(q(k+1), q(k))+S(q(k+1), q(k)) or cp(k)(q(k), q(k+1)) = b(k+1)p(k)(q(k+1), q(k))+
b(k)p(k+1)(q(k+1), q(k))−b(k+1)p(k+1)(q(k), q(k+1))+S(q(k+1), q(k))−S(q(k), q(k+1)).
From this it follows that the advertiser in position k pays a cost per click
c that is increasing in S(q(k+1), q(k)) − S(q(k), q(k+1)). Now in the first model
we know that S(q(k+1), q(k)) − S(q(k), q(k+1)) = 0 because the predicted click-
through rates of the ads in slots j /∈ {k, k + 1} are independent of the quality
scores of the ads in positions k and k + 1, so total social welfare of the ads not
in positions k and k + 1 is also independent of the quality scores of the ads in
positions k and k + 1. And in the second model, when q(k) > q(k+1), we have
S(q(k), q(k+1)) < S(q(k+1), q(k)) because we know from the first paragraph of this
proof that the click-through rates of the ads in slots j /∈ {k, k+1} will be higher
if the allocation of ads in positions k and k+1 is reversed when q(k) > q(k+1) so
the total social welfare of the ads not in positions k and k+1 will also be higher
if the allocation of ads in positions k and k + 1 is reversed.
By combining these results it follows that if q(k) > q(k+1), then the advertiser
in position k pays a higher cost per click in the second model than under the first
model. Similar reasoning then shows that if q(k) < q(k+1), then the advertiser in
position k pays a lower cost per click in the second model than under the first
model. From this it follows that if the allocation of ads that is selected by the two
models of predicted click-through rates is identical, the advertiser in position k
pays more per click under the second model if and only if q(k) > q(k+1). ⊓⊔
Proof of Observation 1: If B denotes the set of positions in which brand ads
are displayed and N denotes the set of positions in which non-brand ads are
displayed, then total expected welfare with respect to the bids of the advertisers
is
∑
j∈B b(j)p(j) +
∑
j∈N b(j)p(j), where b(j) denotes the cost per click bid of the
advertiser in the jth position and p(j) denotes the probability that the advertiser
in the jth position receives a click. Since p(j) = q(j)βj for brand advertisers and
p(j) = q(j)ηj for non-brand advertisers, where q(j) denotes the quality score of
the advertiser in the jth position, it then follows that total expected welfare can
also be written as
∑
j∈B b(j)q(j)βj +
∑
j∈N b(j)q(j)ηj .
But since βj is non-increasing in j, it follows that
∑
j∈B b(j)q(j)βj is max-
imized by placing the brand ad with the highest value of biqi in the highest
position in B, placing the brand ad with the second-highest value of biqi in the
second-highest position in B, and in general placing the brand ad with the kth-
highest value of biqi in the k
th-highest position in B. Similarly,
∑
j∈N b(j)q(j)ηj
is maximized by placing the non-brand ad with the highest value of biqi in the
highest position in N , placing the non-brand ad with the second-highest value of
biqi in the second-highest position in N , and in general placing the non-brand ad
with the kth-highest value of biqi in the k
th-highest position in N . From this it
follows that the optimal allocation of ads indeed involves following the allocation
given in the statement of the observation. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 4: Suppose by means of contradiction that the optimal
allocation involves showing a non-brand ad in a lower position than a brand ad,
and in particular, that this allocation contains a brand ad with eCPM bid vb
in position j, while a non-brand ad with eCPM bid vn is in position k, where
j < k. Then the total social welfare arising from the ads in position j and k is
βjvb + ηkvn. However, the social welfare arising from the ads in these positions
would be βkvb+ ηjvn = βjvb+ ηjvn > βjvb+ ηkvn if the order of these ads were
switched, meaning it would be possible to choose an alternative allocation of ads
with higher social welfare. This contradicts our original assumption and proves
the desired result. ⊓⊔
